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REML A. MABUS, 
PETITIONER/APPELLEE, 
v. 
G. BARTON BLACKSTOCK, BUREAU CHIEF, 
DRIVERS' LICENSE DIVISION, DEPARTMENT 
OF PUBLIC SAFETY, STATE OF UTAH, 
RESPONDENT/APPELLANT. 
PRIORITY NO. 14 
CASENO-981668-CA 
REPLY BRIEF 
This reply brief responds to Points IV, VIII, and IX.1 
REPLY TO POINT IV 
Mabus claims this case would not make good precedent because the 1999 Utah 
Legislature changed the law regarding the provision here at issue. He asserts that the 
amendments changed the report-submission deadline from five to ten days and made 
submission procedural rather than substantive. Brief of Petitioner at 13. Regarding the 
deadline, the change from five to ten days is irrelevant to the legal issue. If, as Mabus 
argues, submission of the report within five days was a jurisdictional prerequisite in 1998, 
1
 This does not mean, of course, that respondent concedes the validity or 
accuracy of the other points in Mabus's brief. 
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then submission within ten days under the amendment is still a prerequisite in 1999. The 
change only constituted a lengthening of the time limit. 
The essential issue here is not the time limit itself, but its jurisdictional effect, if 
any. Mabus argues that failure to submit and failure to submit within the time frame has 
jurisdictional significance; respondent claims it does not. Whether that deadline is five or 
ten days makes no difference to this case or its precedential effect. 
Mabus also alleges that addition of the clause, ff[a]s a matter of procedure" at the 
beginning of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10(d) (Supp. 1999) transforms submission of the 
report from a substantive to a procedural mandate. Here, Mabus strikes at the heart of the 
disagreement in this case, i.e., the legal meaning of the five-day submission rule (which is 
now a ten-day rule). Mabus asserts that the change evidences the legislature's desire to 
make the rule a procedural requirement. To the contrary, the proper way to look at the 
amendment is as clarification of the legislature's original meaning and an attempt to 
correct a court's mistaken interpretation of previous language. 1 A, Norman J. Singer, 
Sutherland Statutory Construction § 22.01 (5th ed. 1993). 
This Court nicely illustrated the principle in State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 545-46 
(Utah App. 1998). There, the legislature had amended Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-405(b) 
(Supp. 1997) after Bryant's trial. In discussing the effect of the amendment, this Court 
ruled that, by Mconstru[ing] and clarifying] a prior statute[, the amendment] will be 
accepted as the legislative declaration of the original act." Amendment of an ambiguous 
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statute indicates a legislature purpose to clarify the ambiguities in the statute rather than 
to change the law." Bryant, 965 P.2d at 546; see also State v. Arbon, 909 P.2d 1270, 
1275 n.4 (Utah App.), cert denied, 916 P.2d 909 (Utah 1996) (such an amendment "may 
intimate that the Legislature has become aware that the earlier language could be 
misconstrued as defendants have done."). 
As seen with the footnote in this Court's 1988 decision in Moore v. Schwendiman, 
750 P.2d 204,205 n.l (Utah App. 1998), the 1988 amendments to Section 41-6-44.10 
were not there directly at issue and, consequently, were not decided authoritatively. The 
obiter dicta nature of the footnote made that statute ambiguous. Though it took several 
years, the Utah Legislature clarified that ambiguity with the 1999 amendment. It is also 
possible that the amendment was a reaction to the lower court's interpretation of the 
statute in this case. 
Consequently, rather than evidencing a change in the report submission rule from a 
substantive to a procedural requirement as Mabus alleges, the 1999 amendment actually 
supports respondent's interpretation of the 1988 amendment to section 41-6-44.10, which 
was in effect when Mabus was stopped for DUI. Under that interpretation, the five-day 
submission rule has been a procedural one since 1988. As a matter of procedure, 
submission within that time frame gives the Drivers' License Division earlier notice that a 
revocation is proceeding, thus implementing the primary purpose of revocation, i.e., 
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"protecting persons on highways by quickly removing from the highways those persons 
who have shown they are safety hazards." Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-222 (1995). 
REPLY TO POINT VIII 
Mabus argues that because the trial court did not h*ve a record of the division's 
license-suspension hearing, it could not have "reviewed" the agency's decision in an 
appellate manner. To the extent this assertion represents respondent's claim as asserting 
that the trial court should have engaged in appellate review, it misreads respondent's 
appeal. Respondent recognizes that trial court review of informal adjudicative 
proceedings is by a new trial in the court, not by review of the agency record. See 
Cordova v. Blackstock, 861 P.2d 449 (Utah App. 1993). Therefore, respondent asks 
neither this Court nor the trial court to make findings based on the agency record. 
What respondent asks instead is simple: that the Mabus be confined strictly to the 
four comers of the petition filed in the trial court. The language in Utah Code Ann. § 63 
46b-15(2)(a) mandates a level of specificity not required under the statutory regime 
present in Moore2 or in general civil complaints. Utah R.Civ.P. (8)(a) (1999) (requiring 
only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 
relief1). Mabus did not, however, allege that the Drivers' License Division failed to 
establish a jurisdictional prerequisite. Because subsection 63-46b-15(2)(a) (1996) 
requires the allegation of "facts demonstrating that the party seeking judicial review is 
2
 Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10 (1981) (amended 1988). 
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entitled to obtain judicial review" and a "statement of the reasons why the Mabus is 
entitled to relief," Mabus was required to aver in the petition failure to submit a signed 
report within five days. The petition did not allege a failure to comply with the five-day 
rule; consequently, that issue is waived. See Utah R.Civ. P. 15(b) (1999); Worrall v. 
Ogden City Fire Dep /, 616 P.2d 598, 602 (Utah 1980); Wright v. University of Utah, 876 
P.2d 380, 384-85 (Utah App. 1994). 
REPLY TO POINT IX 
Mabus claims in his responsive brief that respondent failed to marshal the 
evidence. However vital marshaling may be in appellate practice, it is unnecessary here 
because respondent does not challenge any of the trial court's factual findings.3 Rather, 
respondent challenges solely the trial court's legal conclusion that "failure to submit a 
signed report... is fatal to the revocation process" {Id.). Because respondent does not 
allege that the facts are wrong, marshaling is irrelevant. State v. Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450, 
3
 The trial court made only two findings of fact: 
1. Petitioner is a resident of Salt 
Lake County; 
2. No evidence was presented that 
the peace officer submitted a 
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460 (Utah 1994) ("To prove findings of fact clearly erroneous an appellant must marshal 
all evidence "). 
In other words, if this Court agrees with respondent that submission of the report 
within five days is neither a jurisdictional prerequisite to, nor element of, revocation, then 
the case can simply be remanded to the trial court. It will then be the job of the trial court 
to review the transcript of the hearing and determine whether respondent proved the truly 
necessary elements of revocation. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the trial court's Conclusion of Law No. 44 and remand 
for that court to apply correct law to the evidence established at the hearing. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS 2l June 1999. 
JAN GRAHAM 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
JAMES H. BEADLES 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
4
 "The failure of the peace officer to submit a signed report as required by 
Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-44.10(2)(d) is fatal to the revocation process" (R. 91). 
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ADDENDUM 
1999 VERSION OF UTAH CODE ANN. 41-6-44.10 
(AMENDMENTS IN BOLD) 
41-6-44.10. Implied consent to chemical tests for alcohol or drug - Number of tests 
— Refusal — Warning, report — Hearing, revocation of license — Appeal — Person incapable 
of refusal — Results of test available — Who may give test — Evidence. 
(1) (a) A person operating a motor vehicle in this state is considered to have given his 
consent to a chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, or urine for the purpose of determining 
whether he was operating or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while having a blood or 
breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited under Section 41-6-44, 53-3-231, or 53-3-232, while 
jnder the influence of alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol and any drug under Section 
41-6-44, or while having any measurable controlled substance or metabolite of a controlled 
substance in the person's body in violation of Section 41-6-44.6, if the test is or tests are 
administered at the direction of a peace officer having grounds to believe that person to have 
been operating or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while having a blood or breath 
alcohol content statutorily prohibited under Section 41-6-44,53-3-231, or 53-3-232, or while 
under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol and any drug under Section 
41-6-44, or while having any measurable controlled substance or metabolite of a controlled 
substance in the person's body in violation of Section 41-6-44.6. 
(b) (i) The peace officer determines which of the tests are administered and how many of 
them are administered. 
(ii) If an officer requests more than one test, refusal by a person to take one or more 
requested tests, even though he does submit to any other requested test or tests, is a refusal under 
this section. 
(c) (i) A person who has been requested under this section to submit to a chemical test or 
tests of his breath, blood, or urine, may not select the test or tests to be administered. 
(ii) The failure or inability of a peace officer to arrange for any specific chemical test is 
not a defense to taking a test requested by a peace officer, and it is not a defense in any criminal, 
civil, or administrative proceeding resulting from a person's refusal to submit to the requested 
test or tests. 
(2) (a) If the person has been placed under arrest, has then been requested by a peace 
officer to submit to any one or more of the chemical tests under Subsection (1), and refuses to 
submit to any chemical test requested, the person shall be warned by the peace officer requesting 
the test or tests that a refusal to submit to the test or tests can result in revocation of the person's 
license to operate a motor vehicle. 
(b) Following the warning under Subsection (a), if the person does not immediately 
request that the chemical test or tests as offered by a peace officer be administered a peace officer 
shall serve on the person, on behalf of the Driver License Division, immediate notice of the 
Driver License Division's intention to revoke the person's privilege or license to operate a motor 
vehicle. When the officer serves the immediate notice on behalf of the Driver License Division, 
he shall: 
(i) take the Utah license certificate or permit, if any, of the operator; 
(ii) issue a temporary license effective for only 29 days; and 
(iii) supply to the operator, on a form approved by the Driver License Division, basic 
information regarding how to obtain a hearing before the Driver License Division. 
(c) A citation issued by a peace officer may, if approved as to form by the Driver License 
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Division, serve also as the temporary license. 
(d) As a matter of procedure, the peace officer shall submit a signed report, within ten 
days after the date of the arrest, that he had grounds to believe the arrested person had been 
operating or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while having a blood or breath 
alcohol content statutorily prohibited under Section 41-6-44, 53-3-231, or 53-3-232, or while 
under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol and any drug under Section 
41-6-44, or while having any measurable controlled substance or metabolite of a controlled 
substance in the person's body in violation of Section 41-6-44.6, and that the person had refused 
to submit to a chemical test or tests under Subsection (1). 
(e) (i) A person who has been notified of the Driver License Division's intention to 
revoke his license under this section is entitled to a hearing. 
(ii) A request for the hearing shall be made in writing within ten days after the date of the 
arrest. 
(iii) Upon written request, the division shall grant to the person an opportunity to be 
heard within 29 days after the date of arrest. 
(iv) If the person does not make a timely written request for a hearing before the 
division, his privilege to operate a motor vehicle in the state is revoked beginning on the 30th 
day after the date of arrest for a period of: 
(A) one year unless Subsection (2)(e)(iv)(B) applies; or 
(B) 18 months if the person has had a previous license sanction after July 1,1993, under 
this section, Section 41-6-44.6, 53-3-223, 53-3-231, 53-3-232, or a conviction after July 1,1993, 
under Section 41-6-44. 
(f) If a hearing is requested by the person, the hearing shall be conducted by the Driver 
License Division in the county in which the offense occurred, unless the division and the person 
both agree that the hearing may be held in some other county. 
(g) The hearing shall be documented and shall cover the issues of: 
(i) whether a peace officer had reasonable grounds to believe that a person was operating 
a motor vehicle in violation of Section 41-6-44,41-6-44.6, or 53-3-231; and 
(ii) whether the person refused to submit to the test, 
(h) (i) In connection with the hearing, the division or its authorized agent: 
(A) may administer oaths and may issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and 
the production of relevant books and papers; and 
(B) shall issue subpoenas for the attendance of necessary peace officers. 
(ii) The division shall pay witness fees and mileage from the Transportation Fund in 
accordance with the rates established in Section 21-5-4. 
(i) If after a hearing, the Driver License Division determines that the person was 
requested to submit to a chemical test or tests and refused to submit to the test or tests, or if the 
person fails to appear before the Driver License Division as required in the notice, the Driver 
License Division shall revoke his license or permit to operate a motor vehicle in Utah beginning 
on the date the hearing is held for a period of: 
(i) (A) one year unless Subsection (2)(i)(i)(B) applies; or 
(B) 18 months if the person has had a previous license sanction after July 1,1993, under 
this section, Section 41-6-44.6, 53-3-223, 53-3-231, 53-3-232, or a conviction after July 1,1993, 
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under Section 41-6-44. 
(ii) The Driver License Division shall also assess against the person, in addition to any 
fee imposed under Subsection 53-3-205(14), a fee under Section 53-3-105, which shall be paid 
before the person's driving privilege is reinstated, to cover administrative costs. 
(iii) The fee shall be cancelled if the person obtains an unappealed court decision 
following a proceeding allowed under this Subsection (2) that the revocation was improper. 
(j) (i) Any person whose license has been revoked by the Driver License Division under 
this section may seek judicial review. 
(ii) Judicial review of an informal adjudicative proceeding is a trial. Venue is in the 
district court in the county in which the offense occurred. 
(3) Any person who is dead, unconscious, or in any other condition rendering him 
incapable of refusal to submit to any chemical test or tests is considered to not have withdrawn 
the consent provided for in Subsection (1), and the test or tests may be administered whether the 
person has been arrested or not. 
(4) Upon the request of the person who was tested, the results of the test or tests shall be 
made available to him. 
(5) (a) Only a physician, registered nurse, practical nurse, or person authorized under 
Section 26-1-30, acting at the request of a peace officer, may withdraw blood to determine the 
alcoholic or drug content. This limitation does not apply to taking a urine or breath specimen. 
(b) Any physician, registered nurse, practical nurse, or person authorized under Section 
26-1-30 who, at the direction of a peace officer, draws a sample of blood from any person whom 
a peace officer has reason to believe is driving in violation of this chapter, or hospital or medical 
facility at which the sample is drawn, is immune from any civil or criminal liability arising from 
drawing the sample, if the test is administered according to standard medical practice. 
(6) (a) The person to be tested may, at his own expense, have a physician of his own 
choice administer a chemical test in addition to the test or tests administered at the direction of a 
peace officer. 
(b) The failure or inability to obtain the additional test does not affect admissibility of the 
results of the test or tests taken at the direction of a peace officer, or preclude or delay the test or 
tests to be taken at the direction of a peace officer. 
(c) The additional test shall be subsequent to the test or tests administered at the direction 
of a peace officer. 
(7) For the purpose of determining whether to submit to a chemical test or tests, the 
person to be tested does not have the right to consult an attorney or have an attorney, physician, 
or other person present as a condition for the taking of any test. 
(8) If a person under arrest refuses to submit to a chemical test or tests or any additional 
test under this section, evidence of any refusal is admissible in any civil or criminal action or 
proceeding arising out of acts alleged to have been committed while the person was operating or 
in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, 
combination of alcohol and any drug, or while having any measurable controlled substance or 
metabolite of a controlled substance in the person's body. 
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